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l. INTRODUCTION
Tax noncompliance is now widely recognized to be an extremely serious
problem; recent estimates suggest that at least $90 billion of taxable income 
goes unreported annually-an average of 10 to 15 percent of total taxable 
income . 1 Commissioner of lnternal Revenue Roscoe Egger reported in 1982
that the "income tax gap" in the legal sector grew from $29 billion in 1973 to 
$87 billion in 1981, and he projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985. 2 Shocking 
estimates are also offered of income tax evasion in the illegal sector, 3 and
some observers regard declining compliance as posing a clear and present 
danger to the income tax. -t 
Concern about declining tax compliance has produced an outburst of 
government, tax bar, and academic analyses, but both the causes and the 
\\'e would like to thank Kim Border. Jules Coleman, Alvin Klevorick, Stan Koppleman, and 
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rdt•rees for helpful comments. The financial support provided by National Science Foundation 
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1. Henrv provides a good summary and critique of the techniques used to derive these 
estimates. 
2. Compliance Gap: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on 
Finance, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1982). 
3. See Henry.
4. See, for example. Vitez (191), who remarks that "the dramatic deterioration in compliance 
levels witnessed thus far, if not reversed quickly and forcefully, will gain further momentum and 
eventually erode. beyond repair, the integrity of our present income tax system." 
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appropriate responses to the problem remain controversial . Ta.x noncompli­
ance suggests at least three reasons for concern. First, revenue losses from 
noncompliance become particularly significant at a time of substantial budget 
deficits. Second, tax noncompliance may be creating a nation where citizens' 
disrespect for the tax laws will expand disrespect for other laws. Third, 
compliance is desirable because fairness in taxation requires that equals 
should pay equal taxes. 
Congress has responded to the perceived ta.x compliance crisis by enacting 
legislation in 1981, 1982, and 1984 that provides new and im:reast>d penaltit>s, 
expanded taxpayer information reporting requirements, and novel proce­
dures. Examples include penalties for substantial understatements of hLx 
liabilities (§6661); for aiding and abetting understatements of tax liabilities 
(§6701); for the filing of frivolous returns (§6702) ; for failure to supply 
taxpayer identification numbers (§6676(a)) ;  for failure to file informati<m 
returns (§§6652, 6678, 6686); for extended failure to file tax returns (§6651); 
and for the promotion of abusive tax shelters (§6700) . Criminal fines also were 
increased (§§7201, 7203, 7205, 7206, 7207) and additional information reports 
were required (§§6049, 6041A, 6678, 6050E, 6053(c), 6706, 6708) .  New 
requirements for registering tax shelters with the IRS and for maintaining lists 
of tax shelter investors were enacted (§§6111, 6112, 6707, 6708) and the IRS 
was given authority to seek injunctions against the promoters of abusive tax 
shelters (§6408). Compliance measures were estimated to raise one-third of 
the total revenues to be raised by the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil­
ity Act, and additional compliance legislation seems virtually certain in 1986. 
In adopting these measures, Congress explicitly embraced an economic 
approach to the noncompliance problem-an approach that has seemed to 
dominate policy discussions, notwithstanding important contributions from a 
variety of other disciplines, including law, sociology, and psychology. 5 The
congressional committee reports on the 1982 act, for example, describe the 
tax collection process as a "tax or audit lottery," which presumes that citizens 
endeavor to maximize their own narrowly perceived financial self-interests. 
Unfortunately, the existing paradigm for the economic analysis of tax 
compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue collection process. 
Even as a purely economic model, its exclusive focus on individual taxpayers' 
decisionmaking promotes an unduly restrictive vision of the compliance 
problem and potential responses to it. An inadequate theoretical construct 
may both distort empirical analyses and imply unhelpful policy responses. fi 
Our mission here is to outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for 
analyzing tax compliance. We believe our approach to be a significant im­
provement in the economic theory of law enforcement because it views the 
noncompliance problem as an interactive system.  In our theoretical con-
5. Recent surveys of this literature can be found in Witte and Woodbury (1983) and Cowell. 
6. See Graetz and Wilde. 
-----------
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struct, individual decision making not only depends upon and responds to the 
detection and punishment structure, but, unlike prior models, we also explic­
itly include the law enforcement agency-in this case the Internal Revenue 
Service-as an important interactive element. 
In the next section of this article we outline our general approach and its 
differences from the existing economic law enforcement paradigm. We then 
detail a simple model and its results and compare these results both to the 
prior literature and to some of our ongoing research in an effort to illustrate 
how our theoretical construct may affect predictions. Finally, we describe 
potential extensions of the model, examine its robustness with respect to 
various underlying assumptions, and offer suggestions for further research, 
including possible applications to other law enforcement contexts. 
2. THE NEED FOR AN INTERACTIVE THEORY
!\,lore than fifteen years ago, Gary S. Becker established the basic economics­
of-crime methodology. Generally this approach treats criminal activity as a 
rational individual decision that depends upon probabilities of detection and 
conviction and levels of punishment . Becker explicitly suggested that this 
methodology was applicable to tax evasion and avoidance (170, 172) and it 
frequently has been so applied. The classic treatment can be found in Alling­
ham and Sandmo, where the authors derive conditions under which an in­
crease in the penalty rate or the probability of imposition of sanctions in­
creases the reported taxable income of a rational maximizing taxpayer, who is 
subject to a proportional tax schedule and certain about both the penalty 
schedule and the probability of sanction imposition. 7 
Although the utilization of economic methodology in this context seems 
natural-tax evasion, after all, is an economic crime-most of the theoretical 
results to date do not seem particularly useful for either policy analysis or 
empirical study. The models consider only the actions of taxpayers and ignore 
those of others involved in the revenue collection process. In particular, they 
fail to take into account the interrelationships between flexible IRS policy 
instruments and noncompliance; in prior work, IRS actions and policies are 
treated as exogenous parameters. 8 
7. \Vitte and \\'oodburv (1983) have reviewed various extensions and refinements in the tax 
mmpliance context of Alli1�gham and Sandmo's application of Becker's general model. (See. for 
example. Srinivansan; Yitzhaki; and Fishburn.) Some other authors working in the Becker 
framework have related the compliance problem to labor supply decisions and have discussed 
such questions as the extent to which individuals might shift their labor supply from primary 
markets, where wage income is reported and taxed, to secondary or "underground" markets, 
where wage income is not reported. (For example, see Andersen, Pencavel. and Sandmo). 
8. Although some empirical work based on Becker's model. in contexts other than tax law, has 
taken interrelationships between criminals and law enforcement agencies into account, the 
various theoretical extensions of bis model have not (see Pyle for an excellent summary of the 
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The exclusive focus on taxpayer behavior of the dominant theoretical 
model means that individual-linked variables largely determine the out­
comes. Results, for example, are particularly sensitive to assumptions about 
individuals' attitudes toward risk. In addition, omitting the law enforcement 
agency from the theoretical paradigm makes it natural to ignore important 
legal, political, and institutional factors that in some cases enhance the IRS's 
ability to enforce the tax laws and, in others, inhibit the government's ability 
to apply what might otherwise seem to he theoretically desirable remedies.� 
To be fair, Becker's primary inquiry was explicitly normati,·e-an effort to 
determine the "optimal" choice of punishment strategies. As he put it his 
purpose was to determine "how many resources and how much punishment 
should be used to enforce different kinds of legislation" (170) .  To answer this
question, he needed a positive theory of criminal heha\"ior, which he pro\"ided 
in the form of a rational utility-maximizing decision maker; this has become the 
most influential aspect of his analysis. However, we contend that it is also 
necessary to integrate any positive description of indi\"idual behavior with a 
positive theory of the law enforcement agency to address properly the rele­
vant policy issues. 10 
Our analysis of the tax compliance problem here introduces the IRS as a 
strategic actor in a game-theoretic approach that allows the IRS to condition 
its audit rules on the reports it receives from taxpayers. 11 Although we
believe our methodology to be a significant improvement in thC' economic 
empirical work). There have been a number of papers in the economics of crime literature which 
analyze the optimal penalty system using a utilitarian criterion (Becker: Stigler: Brown and 
Reynolds; Stern: Polinsky and Shavt·lll. While these papers incorporate a kind of equilibrium 
approach, they are neither game-theoretic nor do they permit the probability of detection of 
noncompliance to be sensitive to the actions of the taxpayers (in particular, to reported levels of 
income). In one apparent exception to this, Hoeflich labels his analysis of the tax compliance 
problem "game-theoretic" but fails to use any game-theoretic methodology as commonly under­
stood. 
9. For a general discussion of this problem, see Klevorick. 
10. This approach is dearly endorsed by the empirical likrature on criminal behavior in 
contexts other than tax compliance and amounts to much more than a minor "twist" on Becker's 
approach. A theoretical construct that takes account of the structure of the law enforcement 
process and its relationship to criminal beh<\\"ior is necessary before normative issues properly can 
be addressed. It is useless to ask how changes in the level of punishment, for example, affect 
criminal behavior without taking into account the process by which that punishment is imposed. 
In fact, our simple model suggests-in the tax compliance context at least-that answers to these 
kinds of questions can depend crucially on the behavior of the law enforcement agency. 
11. There have been multi period analyses of the choice of a penalty system to minimize tax 
evasion subject to a budget constraint (Greenberg), to maximize net revenue (Landsberger and 
Meilijson), and to maximize an exogenously given social utility function (Rubinstein). These 
analyses have essentially treated the probability of audit as independent of a taxpayer's reported 
income, although the extent of noncompliance depends on detection probabilities. While detee­
tion probabilities are treated as uniform across taxpayers, some analysts have explored the 
optimal (uniform) probability of detection (see n. 8). In some eases, the probability of audit is 
made contingent upon factors such as whether the taxpayer had been caught underreporting in 
the past (Landsberger and Meilijson; Greenberg; Rubinstein). 
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theory of law enforcement generally, the behavioral framework of tax non­
compliance makes it an especially appropriate case for a theoretical construct 
that explicitly takes into account the interactions and responses of the cogni­
zant law enforcement agency. The tax law, unlike many other laws, requires 
the taxpayer to submit a report, or tax return, that directly conveys a signifi­
cant amount of information to the law enforcement agency. The IRS has broad 
authority to demand that taxpayers supply information on tax returns under 
penalties of perj ury and to adjust its audit and other detection programs in 
light of the reports that it receives . In addition, the IRS has great power to 
demand information rele\'ant to the taxpayer's tax liability from a variety of 
third parties. I:! The IRS also conducts a special series of intensive line-by-line 
audits of a randomly selected group of taxpayers (called the Taxpayer Compli­
ance �leasurement Program, or TC�I P); this program demonstrates the 
extent to which careful audits will detect tax understatements (and overstate­
ments) and guides the allocation of IRS audit resources. 1·3 
It is a major weakness of the existing theoretical literature to ignore this 
central feature of the tax system-a preliminary round of information 
transmission-and to treat the IRS either as a completely exogenous element 
of the re\'enue collection process or, at best, as constrained to audit all 
taxpayers with the same frequency. In fact, the IRS audit selection process 
clearly turns on the information it receives from taxpayers, and the evidence 
suggests that the IRS is more likely than taxpayers to act in a rational, 
optimizing manner. Thus, the revenue collection process is better seen as a 
"game" with levels of noncompliance, auditing, and penalty assessment de­
termined by the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS. 
Two of us have previously analyzed a so-called principal/agent model of 
income tax evasion in which the IRS is designated the principal and the 
12. In subsequent work, we expect to expand our systemic analysis to take into account the
impact of third-party agents on the noncompliance problem. The advisory role of attorneys, 
accountants, and tax-return preparers, for example, invites careful theoretical attention. 
13. Recent estimates of legal sector noncompliance (and empirical studies of them) almost
invariably involve extrapolations from the TC\IP. The tax understatements that are detected by 
the random audits are then extrapolated to the broader universe of taxpayers generally. This is not 
an occasion for evaluating TCMP in detail, but measuring aggregate noncompliance is not its 
principal function. The TC\IP is principally designed to establish and refine IRS audit selection 
mechanisms. a task for which it is well suited, because TC\1P provides direct evidence of how 
much tax understatement or overstatement can be detected bv careful audits. It is an excellent 
mechanism for assessing audit effectiveness, for guiding th� allocation of scarce IRS audit 
resources, and for predicting how many dollars of additional tax revenues might be produced from 
additional dollars spent on tax audits. Coincidentally, it produces the best available data for 
estimating noncompliance, certainly better than what is likely to emerge from surveys. But 
extrapolations from TCM P  data to estimate aggregate noncompliance are necessarily subject to 
the inherent limitations ofTCM P. To the extent that taxpayers selected for TC\<IP audits are able 
to conceal, for example, unreported cash income from the TCM P  auditor, extrapolated estimates 
of noncompliance will be understated. That TCM P  generally misses nonfilers altogether has 
further restricted its validity as a mechanism for estimating noncompliance. See Graetz and 
Wilde. 
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taxpayer the agent (Reinganum and Wilde, 1985). 14 This formulation permits
the IRS to adjust its audit and enforcement strategy in light of the information 
contained in a taxpayer's report and thereby treats IRS behavior as endoge­
nous to the model . The principal/agent model used, however, requires the 
IRS to announce and commit to an audit policy before receiving taxpayers' 
reports .  This audit policy will typically prove suboptimal once taxpayers' 
reports have been received; thus,  the IRS will have incentives to deviate from 
its announced policy once the reports are submitted. Taxpayers will anticipate 
such deviations and will not believe (or be influenced by) the previously 
announced policy. In the game-theoretic approach employed here, we there­
fore restrict the set of strategies available to the IRS to eliminate such "empty 
threats." 
The model described in the next section of this paper neither permits nor 
requires precommitment; instead, it follows the natural temporal sequence of 
decisions .  First, the taxpayer reports his or her income; then the IRS decides 
(on the basis of the taxpayer's reported income) whether to perform an 
investigative audit. 15 If the taxpayer is not audited, the taxpayer's report
determines his or her final tax liability; if the taxpayer is audited, his or her tax 
liability is computed on the basis of true income (which we assume to be 
discovered in the audit process), plus any applicable fines, penalties , or 
interest. 
Explicitly including the law enforcement agency in an economic analysis of 
noncompliance requires us to make specific assumptions about characteristics 
of the agency's behavior in order to specify the actions that it will take in 
response to actions taken by individuals. Needless to say, any particular 
specification of an agency's preferences over such decisions is likely to be 
controversial and may have an important impact on the predictions of the 
theory. In our basic model, we assume that the IRS in its enforcement strategy 
attempts to maximize total government revenue, including taxes, interests, 
and penalties, net of audit costs. We regard this as a reasonable assumption 
and, to date at least, have found none other that we find more convincing, 
although we do not mean to suggest that others might not be equally reason­
able or, perhaps, even better. 16 This question of the IRS's preferences is
explored further in section 5 below. 
14. Border and Sobel (1985) have also examined this problem. Related principal-agent
models have been analyzed in the accounting literature. For a survey of the latter, see Demski 
and Kreps and the references cited therein. 
15. Given the equilibrium concept that we employ, taxpayers are assumed to know the audit
strategy used by the IRS. 
16. The assumption that the IRS maximizes expected net revenue (rather than some measure
of social welfare) reflects our decision to take a positive rather than a normative approach. This is 
not to say that government has no normative or redistributional goals, only thdc these seem to us 
more properly regarded as being embodied in the tax schedule itself or in programs which make 
subsequent use of tax revenue. Our interpretation seems consistent with the current use of 
expected "yield" criteria for the selection of returns for audit (for example, the TCMP program). 
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A number of policymakers, including Commissioner Egger, seem to 
perceive the current noncompliance problem to be one of eroding ethics­
that more and more people are refusing to comply voluntarily with the tax laws 
and instead are responding "strategically" to the enforcement structure of the 
income tax laws. Commissioner Egger believes that the proportion of people 
who routinely and habitually comply with income tax rules is declining, 
perhaps at a rapid pace . 17 In an effort to begin to to analyze this problem, our
model includes two types of taxpayers: (1) the "strategic noncmnpliers"-the 
type of individuals posited by the standard economics of crime literature, who 
maximize results by weighing rationally the potential costs and benefits of 
understating tax liability; and (2) the "habitual compliers"--individuals who 
endeavor to report taxable income correctly without regard either to the costs 
and benefits of playing the audit lottery or to their perceptions about the 
compliance behavior of others. By developing a model that has the potential to 
consider the impact of such a variety of types of taxpayers, 18 we may eventu­
ally be able to distinguish among classes of taxpayers depending upon their 
relative opportunities to avoid taxes as well as their attitudes. Habitual 
compliers. for example, may be thought of as persons who have little or no real 
opportunity not to comply, such as wage-earners in the legal sector without 
time to moonlight who do not itemize deductions. 
See also Wertz. who discusses the appropriate IRS objective function in detail and cites several 
administrators and observers of tax administration who believe revenue maximization to be one of 
the primary goals of the IRS. 
17. For example, Commissioner Egger (page 5) has remarked:
Tht•re has alwavs been some resistance in this countrv, from colonial times onward, to
virtually every form of taxation. As a general rule, with �ome exceptions, the resistance or
protest was episodic and geographically contained. The system was never seriously
threatened or weakened. From early times, as de Tocqueville observed, most Americans
had an unusual willingness to engage in voluntary activity for the public good. It can be
credited in part to the "frontier mentality" which required cooperation for survival. That
willingness still exists in large part; nwst Americans do engage in the spirit of voluntarism
and most Americans do subscribe voluntarily to and comply with the tax laws to which we
are all subject . . . .  Unfortunately, a growing number of what are otherwise honest 
citizens are becoming non-persons in the tax system or are finding various ways to 
submerge parts of their income. so as not to have it subject to taxation. 
. 18. \Ve believe that there exist at least two other types of taxpayers who should be consideredma eomplete model of tax noncompliance, but who we do not consider in the model set forth 
here. These we la be I: ( 1) the "coordinating compliers "-individuals who would feel duped if they
thought they were routinely complying with the tax laws while others were not and who therefore
approach compliance decisions in a manner consistent with the way they think others arebehaving; and (2) the "noncomplying criminals"-individuals who are engaged in other illegalactivities and whose decisions about tax compliance is related to ancillary exposure to othercriminal penalties. Al Capone and Spiro Agnew are probably the two best-known examples of thislatter category. In principle. these distinctions among types of taxpayers could be made endoge­nous by adding various "costs," psychic or otherwise, into taxpayers' utility functions, but thereseems little gain in doing so. For further discussion of the implications of including a variety of
categories of taxpayers, see below, section 4.5. 
f 
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The model treats income levels, tax rates, and fines as exogenous . This 
treatment of fines differs somewhat from their typical treatment in the eco-
nomics oflaw enforcement l iterature but follows naturally from our decision to 
use a model that treats the law enforcement agency as an endogenous interac-
tive actor. The level of fines, after all, is typically set by the legislative branch, 
and although the law enforcement agency may have considerable discretion in 
determining how to apply statutory penalties, it will be constrained by the 
statutory requirements. The statutory level of fines, as well as the necessary 
conditions for their application-for example, the requirement that the tax-
payer's tax understatement be determined to be willful in order to apply fraud 
penalties-in turn may depend on a variety of legal, moral, and political 
constraints. In contrast, the economics of crime literature standardly treats 
fines as a variable that can be adjusted to maximize a specified social welfare 
function and, principally because of the costs of detection, often yields the 
recommendation that fines should be set at the maximum level with corres­
ponding probabilities of detection at the minimum. (One wag has described 
the resulting policy prescription as one that typically recommends hanging 
with probability zero. )  As the following discussion will make clear, our treat-
ment of the level of fines as an exogenous variable does not produce any 
difference in their impact on individual decisionmaking, nor does it eliminate 
potential tradeoffs between changes in the level of fines and probabilities of 
detection. Our model, however, does require us to address explicitly the 
question of how the existence and level offines should be treated in describing 
both the preferences and the actions of the law enforcement agency. 
For mathematical tractability, in the model set forth here, income has one 
of two values, high or low. The IRS does not observe true income: instead, it 
must rely initially on the report made by the taxpayer.  The basic model 
assumes the IRS can audit as many taxpayers as it wants; initially we impose no 
budget constraint (but other of our work including budget constraints is 
discussed in part 5). rn 
The model is considered to be solved when a Nash equilibrium is reached. 
Such an equilibrium involves a probability of audit, chosen by the IRS , and a 
probability of noncompliance, chosen by those taxpayers who act strategi­
cally. A Nash equilibrium in this context is a pair of strategies by taxpayers and 
the IRS that are best responses to each other; at a Nash equilibrium, neither 
the IRS nor potential noncompliers have an incentive (unilaterally) to change 
their strategies. 20 The purpose of using an equilibrium concept in a theoreti-
19. As will become clear subsequently, relaxing those two assumptions-that income can
take only two levels and that the IRS is not budget-constrained-increases dramatically the 
mathematical complexity of the analysis we are proposing here. Although these assumptions are 
obviously unrealistic when considering tax noncompliance generally, they may be adequate in 
evaluating tax enforcement within specific audit classes. 
20. In a Nash equilibrium, each agent's strategy is optimal, given the other agent's equilib­
rium strategy. In particular, this means that taxpayers know the audit strategy used by the IRS. 
For a further discussion of the reasonableness of this assumption see Graetz and Wilde. 
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cal model-such as the use of the Nash equilibrium here-is that it will be sug­
gestive of directions and tendencies of the relevant parties' responses in the 
context of a complex dynamic process. In analyzing these responses, several 
seemingly counter-intuitive results emerge-for example, an increase in tax 
rates on high income is found to decrease noncompliance. 21 These results
occur largely because in our model the audit policy of the IRS is codetermined 
with the reporting behavior of potential noncompliers . The details of these 
results will be discussed in parts .t and 5 below.
The next section of this paper will present our formal model and describe 
the equilibrium. 22 
3. A SI�IPLE INTERACTIVE �IODEL
Our formal model translates the concepts discussed in the last section into
mathematical terms and characterizes the equilibrium levels of auditing and 
noncompliance that emerge from the interaction of the IRS and taxpayers. 
Our model is relatively simple as models go and we will endeavor to explain 
each step to the nontechnical reader as we proceed. A more concise presenta­
tion \vhich presumes familiarity with the technical economics literature can be 
found in Graetz et al. (1983). 
Suppose that some taxpayers are "habitual compliers"; that is, they report 
their income truthfully regardless of their pecuniary interest .  The remaining 
taxpayers act strategically; they examine their incentives carefully and act so 
as to maximize expected utility, taking as given the probability of audit 
associated with the income they choose to report. \Ve denote the proportion 
of strategic taxpayers by p and the proportion of habitual compliers by 1 - p, 
where 0 < p < 1.
For simplicity, we assume there are only two income classes-high and 
low, denoted IH and IL, respectively, where IL < IH. The IRS does not
directly observe income; thus the taxpayers, regardless of their income, 
actually may report either high or low income. 23 
Denote by TH and TL the individual tax payments owed by high- and 
low-income taxpayers, respectively . We assume that TL� h, TH� IH,
and TL � TH· A taxpayer who is discovered to be underreporting income is
21. For discussion. sec helow. section 4.4. 
22. Our model of the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS is a standard two-state. 
two-action game. P'ng and Salant and Rest have used this type of model to analyze the litigation of 
settlement demands in civil torts cases. Subsequently, Salant (1984) has generalized their analysis 
to include an interval of possible settlement demands. 
23. \Ve implicitly assume taxpayers can only submit reports of h or IH even though, in 
P.rinciple, other reports are feasible. One way to rationalize this assumption, which greatly 
sunplifies the analysis. is to assume taxpayers must report their income on a standard form that 
only allows them the option of indicating low or high income. At a less general level, the model 
may also be thought of as dealing with a particular deduction or tax credit. which the taxpayer has 
only the option of taking or not claiming. 
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fined in addition to being assessed the tax on high income; this fine is denoted 
by F, where F::;;:: 0. We assume that the IRS treats as fixed the tax levels and
the fine for underreporting. 24 
Auditing, of course, is costly to the IRS;  we denote the cost of a single audit 
by c, where c::;;:: 0. We further suppose that TH+ F - TL> c; that is, the
increment to revenue associated with uncovering a noncomplier exceeds the 
audit cost. If this were not true, then even if noncompliers could be identified 
a priori, it would not pay to audit them and collect the additional taxes and 
fines. We also assume that TL+ F �hand TH+ F � ]H; the sum of taxes 
plus fines cannot exceed a taxpayer's income. 
We assume taxpayers who report truthfully are never fined and suffer no 
other costs if they are audited (this assumption can be relaxed; see section 5). 
Finally, q represents the probability that a randomly chosen taxpayer has high 
income, where 0 < q < 1. Since each taxpayer is viewed as drawing high 
income with this probability, auditing one taxpayer provides no information 
about the income of any other taxpayer. 2.5 
A simple "game tree" (figure 1) describes the information and ·actions 









24. Both taxes and the general structure of penalties are fixed by the legislative branch,
although the IRS has some control over the choice of penalty (for example, civil versus criminal). 
We ignore the latter distinction in this analvsis. 
25. Each taxpayer's income is a random v�riable which takes the high value with probahility q 
and the low value with the complementary probability 1 - q. It is important to view q as the ex
ante probability that a randomly drawn taxpayer has high income, rather than the realized 
frequency of high-income taxpayers. The IRS is assumed to be unable to observe the realized 
distribution of income, as well as the income of any individual taxpayer. Under this interpretation 
of q, the realized distribution of reports provides no further information about the veracity of a
given report beyond that contained in the report itself. 
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information sets. Points in the game tree enclosed b y  the same information set 
are indistinguishable to the agent whose turn it is to make a decision at that 
stage. 
Since we assume initially that taxpayers who report truthfully suffer no cost 
by being audited, taxpayers with low income will always report truthfully. 
Thus a strategy for a strategic taxpayer is simply a probability of reporting low
income when he or she actually has high income. \Ve denote this probability 
by a .  Any probability between 0 and 1 is a feasible strategy for strategic 
taxpayers, so the only constraint on their behavior is 0 ,,:; a ,,:; 1 .
Since the I RS cannot distinguish a priori between compliers and non­
compliers (that is, from a report of low income alone), in order to evaluate the 
benefits of auditing it must compute the distribution of honest and dishonest 
taxpayers among those who report low income. Let µ.(a) be the probability that 
a taxpayer who reports low income actually has high income, given that 
strategic taxpayers report low income when they really have high income with 
probability a .  A routine statistical calculation known as Bayes's rule implies 
µ.(a) = pqa /[pqa + 1 - q]. (1) 
Equation (1) has a simple explanation.  Taxpayers report low income either 
when they really have low income (this happens with probability 1 - q) or 
when they have high income and lie (this happens with probability pqa ) .  
A strategy for the IRS ,  meanwhile, is simply a probability of auditing a
taxpayer who reports low income, since, in this model, it would have no 
reason to audit a taxpayer who reports high income. We denote this probabil­
ity by 13. Again, any probability between 0 and 1 is a feasible strategy for the 
IRS, so the only constraint on IRS behavior is 0 ,,:; 13 ,,:; 1. Expected net
revenue to the I RS when it observes a report of low income, strategic 
taxpayers who observe high income report low with probability a, and the IRS 
audits low income reports with probability 13 can be written formally as 
Il(a,13) = 13[µ.(TH + F - c) + (1 - µ.)(TL - c)] + (1 - 13)TL·
The first term in this expression is the expected return from an audit, net of
audit costs, and the second term is the certain revenue received if no audit is
performed.
Let the taxpavers · utilitv fonction over certain income be denoted bv u( · ) . 
T��n the payoff to a strategic taxpayer who has high income, in expected�ihty terms, given that he or she reports low income with probability a and is
t ereby audited with probability 13, is 
U(a,13) = a[l3u(/H - TH - F) + (1  - 13)u(/H - TL)]
+ ( 1  - a)u(/H - TH). 
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The first term in this expression is the expected utility of reporting low income 
and the second term is the certain utility received if high income is reported. 
\Ve assume the utility of certain income is increasing in income but at a 
decreasing rate (that is, the marginal utility of certain income is falling­
taxpayers are risk-averse). 26 \Ve also assume the IRS is risk-neutral. 
A best response for the IRS to a given reporting rule used by potential
noncom pliers is a strategy which maximizes the IRS's net ren.'nue, gin·n that 
all the potential noncompliers use the specified reporting rule. Similarly, a 
best response for potential noncompliers to any gin•n auditing rule is a
strategy that maximizes expected utility, given the specified auditing rule. 
Finally, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies that are best responses to 
each other; at a Nash equilibrium neither the IRS nor potential noncompliers 
have an incentive to (unilaterally) change their strategies. 
Thus, in formal te:-ms, a best response for the IRS to a gi\ ·en strategy a for
potential noncompliers is a strategy �(a) such that Il(o., �(a)) � Il\o., J3l for all
other strategies J3. Similarly, a best response for potential noncompliers to
any given auditing policy J3 is a strategy &(J3) such that U(a(J3}, J3l � U(o., J3)
for all otl1er strategies a. Finally, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies
(a*, J3*) such that a* = &(J3*) and J3* = �(a*).
For any given probability of noncompliance used by potential noncom­
pliers, a, the IRS wants to choose its audit probability to maximize its expected 
net revenue; that is, it sets J3 to maximize Il(o., J3). The marginal benefit of 
auditing a taxpayer who reports low income is 
(2)
The marginal benefit of auditing a taxpayer who reports low income in­
creases with (a) the conditional probability that the taxpayer has high income 
given that he or she reported low income, (b) the tax owed by high-income 
taxpayers, and (c) the fine. Since the conditional probability of high income 
given a report of low income increases with (a) the probability that a strategic 
taxpayer reports low income when true income is high, (b) the proportion of 
strategic taxpayers relative to all taxpayers, and (c) the proportion of high­
income taxpayers relative to all taxpayers, the marginal benefit of auditing a 
taxpayer who reports low income also inc:-eases with these variables. The 
marginal benefit of auditing a taxpayer who reports low income decreases with 
the tax owed by low-income taxpayers and the cost ofaudit .  Notice, however, 
that it is independent of the likelihood of audit i tself; that is, the benefits of 
auditing low-income reports are linear in the audit probability. 27 In fact, if the 
26. In formal terms, we assume u(.) is twice-differentiable with u'(.) > 0 and u"(.) < 0. 
27. This property is not an artifact of any unusual assumptions used in our model but follows
directly from the assumption that the IRS maximizes expected revenue. It is a standard feature of 
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis that expected utility is linear in 
probability. In this case, the returns to auditing will be linear in the probability of audit. 
L 
TH E TAX CO�IPLIANCE GAM E / 13 
conditional probability that the taxpayer has high income given that he or she 
reported low income (µ) is such that the marginal benefit of auditing is 
positive, then it always pays to audit, and if it is such that the marginal benefit 
of auditing is negative, then it never pays to audit .  Thus, if we define µ so 
that (2) is equal to zero-µ = c!( TH + F - TL)-then we can describe the
IRS's best response to any specified reporting rule, �(a), by { = 1 if µ(a) > µ 
�(a) E[O,l] ifµ(a)=fi.28
= 0 if µ(a) < µ 
where µ(a) is given by equation ( ll. But we can say more: since equation (1)
describes howµ depends on a, we can substitute directly from that expression 
to obtain { 1 if a> a 
�(a) E [O.l] if a = a,
0 i f  a < a 
where 
a = (1 - q )c!pq( TH + F - TL - c). (3) 
Here a > O unless the fine is infinite (assuming that O < q < 1 and c > 0).
But we have assumed that F � IH - TH; that is, the IRS cannot take more 
than a person's income.  Thus the IRS's best response to the potential non­
complier's strategy (a probability of noncompliance) is to audit if and only 
if the probability of noncompliance is sufficiently high that it exceeds some 
trigge1· value a. This trigger value is strictly greater than O; that is, it is
never a best response for the IRS to audit whenever the probability of non­
compliance is positive. It is possible that a > 1 ,  however, so that it might
necer pay the IRS to audit (for example. if the cost of audit is high enough). 
For a µ;iven probability of audit, [3, the strategic taxpayer wishes to 
choose a probability of noncompliance so as to maximize his or her expected 
utility of net income; that is, he or she sets a to maximize U(a, [3). The 
marginal gain to reporting low income when a taxpayer actually has high 
income-that is, the marginal benefit of noncompliance--is 
CiU(a,[3)/Cia = (1 - [3)[u(!H - TL) - u(!H - TH)]
+ [3[u(/u - TH - F) - u(lu - TH )]. (4)
28. The notation �(a) E [ 0. l] means the IRS is indifferent to any probability of audit between
0 and 1. 
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This gain decreases with (a) the probability of audit, (b) the fine, and (c) the 
tax owed by low-income taxpayers. The dependence of this gain on the tax 
owed by high-income taxpayers is ambiguous in general. This is because 
increasing the tax owed by high-income taxpayers not only increases the gain 
from noncompliance when the taxpayer is not audited but also increases the 
loss from noncompliance when the taxpayer is apprehended and punished. For 
risk-neutral taxpayers , the marginal benefit of noncompliance increases with 
the amount of tax owed by high-income taxpayers. More important, however, 
is the fact that the marginal benefit of noncompliance is independent of the 
likelihood of noncompliance itself; that is, the benefits of noncompliance are 
linear in the probability of noncompliance. 29 Thus, the potential noncom plier 
will always comply if the probability of audit (13) is such that the marginal 
benefits of noncompliance are negative and \vill never comply if it is such that 
the marginal benefits of noncompliance are positive. Hence, if we define � so
that (4) is equal to zero, that is, 
then we can describe the taxpayer's best response to any specified audit rule, 
&(13) , by 
if 13 < 13 
if 13 = �·30 
if 13 > 13
It is easy to show that 0 < j3 < 1 .  Thus the potential noncomplier's best 
response to the IRS's strategy (a probability of audit) is to comply if and only if 
the probability of audit is sufficiently high that it exceeds some trigger value � .
This trigger value lies strictly between 0 and l; that is. it is not necessary to
audit every low-income return to induce compliance. 
Given the two best-response functions �(a) and &(13) we are in a position to
calculate equilibrium configurations. If we think in terms of graphs, each of 
these best-response functions defines a curve in two-dimensional space (one 
dimension representing a and the other representing 13). The equilibrium is
given where these curves intersect. Since both best-response functions take 
the value 0 or 1 except at their respective trigger values (Ci and �), the
equilibrium strategies will equal those trigger values so long as both are 
between 0 and 1 .  It is always the case that 0 < � < 1, but it might be that
29. As with auditing, that the marginal benefits of noncompliance are linear in the probability
of noncompliance is a standard consequence of the assumption that taxpayers maximize expected 
utility. 
30. The notation a(j3) E [O, I] means the taxpayer is indifferent to any probability of noncom­
pliance between 0 and 1. 
r 
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Ci > 1 .  Thus combining the best-response functions gives two possible equi­
librium configurations. In the first configuration, illustrated in figure 2, all 
strategic taxpayers underreport but there is no auditing; that is, (a*, 13*) = (1,
0). In this case, it is not worth auditing any individual who reports low income 
even if all strategic taxpayers are known to be underreporting, because the 
IRS still cannot tell (without auditing) whether an individual who reports low 
income is reporting truthfully (a taxpayer with low income) or untruthfully 
(a strategic taxpayer with high income). This situation, which occurs when 
the trigger value Ci exceeds 1, arises for any of several reasons; for example,
audit costs may be high, the proportion of strategic taxpayers may be low, 
or the proportion of low-income taxpayers may be high. 31 
In the second configuration auditing sometimes pays: Ci < 1. In equilib­
rium, some strategic taxpayers with high income actually do underreport, and 
some taxpayers who report low income actually are audited; in particular, (a*, 
13*) = (Ci, 13). This case is illustrated in figure 3.
The next section of this paper will discuss the implications of this basic 
model, focusing on how changes in underlying parameters affect Ci and p, 
assuming both are between 0 and 1 .  






(O ,0) (1,0) 
Figure 2. Best-response Functions in the Basic Model \Vhen a � 1 .
t 31. The knife-edge case of a = 1 has a continuum of equilibria. In this situation, all strategic �payers underreport, and the IRS is indifferent regarding the probability with which it audits 
payers who report low income. 







(O ,0) (1 ,0) 
Figure 3. Best-response Functions in the Basic Model When a < l.
4. RES U LTS
As we have indicated, the purpose of the preceding formal model is to
illustrate, in a relatively simple framework, some of the effects of introducing 
the IRS as a strategic actor in the compliance game. The sort of "results" 
typically yielded by economic models of tax compliance take the form of 
comparative statics; that is, they consist of predictions concerning the effects 
of changing underlying parameters such as tax rates or the cost of audits on the 
equilibrium values of the choice variables of the model. In the classic eco­
nomic model of tax compliance the principal choice variable is the extent of 
underreporting. 32 In our interactive framework the choice var�bles are the
probability of underreporting, ii, and the probability of audit, J3 (the former
given that the taxpayer acts strategically and has high income and the latter 
given that a report oflow income has been received by the IRS). Two related 
variables are the probability that a randomly drawn taxpayer will be a non­
complier (denoted PN and given by PN = qpii) and the probability that a
randomly drawn report will be audited (denoted PA and given by PA = 
32. As n. 7 above indicates, some authors have extended the Allingham and Sandmo model to
include the labor/leisure choice of taxpayers in addition to the choice of how much to underreport 
income (Andersen; Pencavel). Others have introduced a distinction between "regular" and 
"irregular" labor markets in which income from the former is automatically reported (Isachsen 
and Strom; Sandmo). In these latter models the taxpayer must decide how much labor to allocate 
to each market as well as how much irregular income to report. 
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�(qpa + 1 q)). :3:3 The latter two variables represent aggregate noncompli­
ance and aggregate auditing, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the effects of 
changes in the underlying parameters on these four variables. Some of the 
effects may initially seem counter-intuitive primarily because they depend 
upon equilibrium interactions between the taxpayer and the IRS. The discus­
sion following table 1 describes the results, offers intuitive explanations for 
them, and compares them to those found in the existing literature (where 
applicable). 
In interpreting our results, the reader should keep in mind that, even 
though we have presented our model here as if it were a global representation 
of the noncompliance problem, the model might also be viewed as addressing 
issues of noncompliance across a relatively small range of income-for exam­
ple, within a given audit class. As our subsequent discussion in part 5 of 
extensions and modifications of the model suggests, this basic model may well 
have advantages over more mathematically complex models for analyzing this 
important set of issues. 
Table 1. Direction of Change: The Basic Model 
Exogenous parameter to be increased 
Endogenous variable 
Individual probabilitv
of noncompli anct> (a)
Aggre)?;ate probabilitvof noncompliance (P�) 












Probability Tax on Tax on 
of H igh High Low 













•Ambiguous in genernL when taxpayers are risk-neutral, this entr y is +. 
0 **Ambiguous in generaL when taxpayers are risk-neutral. these entries are aPA!aTH = -aPA!aTL"' (,;;;OlasF;;.c(,,:c). 
33. The probability that a randomly drawn taxpayer will be a noncomplier is given by the
�roduct of the probability of being a strategic taxpayer (p) times the probability of having high•n�me (q) times the probability of not complying (a). Hence PN = qpa. The probability that a 
��I �mly observed report will be audited is given by the product of the probability that_!he reportp _ � low-mcome (qpa + 1 - q) times the probability that it will be audited (f3). Hence
A 
- J3(qpa + 1 - q). 
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4. 1 .  FINES
We begin with the effects of increases in the fine for noncompliance since, 
although our methodology is different, 3-t these results agree with those found
in the existing literature. As in the standard economics of crime and t<l\: 
evasion literature, an increase in the fine for underreporting reduces hoth the 
likelihood that a potential noncom plier actually fails to comply and aggregate 
noncompliance. In our model, however, an increase in the fine also results in 
less auditing, both of individual low-income reports and in the aggregate . The 
direct impact of an increase in the fine is to increase the marginal benefit of 
auditing, but it also increases the marginal cost of noncompliance so that 
strategic taxpayers respond by increasing their compliance rate . This allows 
the IRS to reduce the probability of audit in the new equilibrium. But driYing 
equilibrium noncompliance (and the equilibrium probability of audit) to zero 
would require an infinite fine . 
4.2 .  AUDIT COSTS 
The existing literature has little to say about the effects of changes in audit 
costs on noncompliance because the probability of audit is generally taken as 
given. In our model, an increase in audit costs results in an increase in both 
individual and aggregate noncompliance. It has no effect on the probability of 
audit for an individual who reports low income, but it increases the aggregate 
number of audits. 
To understand why this must be so, suppose there is an exogenous increase 
in audit costs. If potential noncom pliers made no adjustment in their behav­
ior, then it would no longer pay the IRS to audit as often. But then potential 
noncompliers would have an incentive to underreport more frequently, 
which in turn would cause the IRS to increase its audit rate . In the new 
equilibrium there must be no incentive for either the IRS or taxpayers to make 
further adjustments of this sort. This happens when potential noncompliers 
increase the probability of underreporting just enough to compensate the IRS 
for the increase in audit costs by making the average audit more productive (in 
terms of discovering actual noncompliers and collecting more taxes and fines). 
Hence individual noncompliance and aggregate noncompliance increase. 
This increase in noncompliance perfectly offsets the increase in audit costs, so 
that the probability of audit for a taxpayer who reports low income is unaf­
fected in equilibrium. In spite of this, because the aggregate number of 
low-income reports increases and because each of these taxpayers is audited 
with an unchanged probability, the aggregate number of audits increases. 
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4 .3 .  THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Recall that q is the probability that a random taxpayer has high income. An
increase in this probability thus reflects an upward shift in the distribution of 
income. In such case, it will be less likely that a given taxpayer who reports 
low income actually is a low-income individual, so that the IRS will have a 
greater incentive to audit. Thus, in the new equilibrium, each strategic 
taxpayer will respond to an upward shift in the distribution of income by 
decreasing his or her probability of noncompliance, thereby compensating 
the IRS for the increase in the marginal benefit of auditing. Again, as with 
changes in audit costs, the probability of audit among those who report low 
income is unaffected in the new equilibrium, so both noncompliance and the 
probability of audit decrease in the aggregate. 
4.4. TAX RATES 
An important class of results involves changes in the level of taxes.  First, 
consider an increase in taxes on high-income individuals. This is analogous to 
an increase in the progressivity of the tax rate schedule since the tax on low 
income is unchanged.  (In part 5 we assume taxes are proportional to income 
and consider the effects of changes in the tax rate. ) An increase in the tax on 
high income increases the marginal gain to underreporting but also increases 
the marginal gain to auditing. The latter effect dominates,  so in the new 
equilibrium both individual and aggregate noncompliance fall .  35 An increase 
in the tax on high income can either increase or decrease audit rates, depend­
ing on the risk preferences of taxpayers. 36 Generally speaking, increases in
the tax on low income have opposite effects to those stemming from increases 
in the tax on high income. 37 
f 35. That increases in the tax rate might increase compliance regardless of the risk preferences
0 taxpayers is an important result. It illustrates dramatically the importance of an interactive�ode!, and it also demonstrates the need for formal models generally . It is a fairly obvious�h servatio� that an increase in the tax rate should increase both the incentives to underreport ande incentives to audit. But intuition alone cannot determine the ultimate effects of these
�nflicting forces. A formal model often can. and we use the term "dominate" to refer to the incentive that ultimately prevails in the new equilibrium which results from a parametric change.
. 36. As noted in table 1, if taxpayers are indifferent to risk, an increase in the tax on highincome will increase the probability that a given low-income report will be audited. Whether:ggregate auditing increases depends on the size of the fine relative to the audit cost, that is,�:_gate auditing increases or decreases as the fine is greater than or less than the audit cost.
u 1 · Unlike increases in the tax on high income, an increase in the tax on low income vields an
it�
mbiguous prediction regarding the probability that a given low-income report will be.audited:
aud':
creases. The effect on aggregate audits again depends on the size of the fine relative to the
th It codst; that is, aggregate auditing increases or decreases as the fine is less than or greater thane au 1t cost .  
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4 .5. TH E  PERCENTAGE OF STRATEGIC NONCOMPLIERS 
As indicated previously, the belief that deteriorating ethics is in part 
responsible for increases in tax noncompliance makes the effects of changes in 
the proportion of strategic taxpayers in the population particularly interest­
ing. 38 The reason for such a change does not matter in our model. The 
proportion of strategic noncompliers might increase, for example, either 
because of a change in taxpayer attitudes or because, even without a change in 
underlying attitudes, the structure of penalties and IRS enforcement policies 
now make it more profitable for increased numbers of people not to comply. 
Of course, many people may have always acted strategically ; we may simply 
have become better able to measure the extent of such behavior. 
In any event, in our model, an increase in the percentage of strategic 
taxpayers has only one effect: to reduce the likelihood that any strategic 
taxpayer with high income fails to report honestly. This results because with 
more potential noncompliers (more taxpayers who may falsely report lmv 
income), a report of low income is correspondingly more likely to have come 
from a strategic taxpayer who has failed to comply than from a habitual 
complier with low income. Thus, although there are more potential non­
compliers, in the new equilibrium each is more likely to comply, and these 
effects exactly cancel out so that the aggregate number of taxpayers who fail to 
comply is unaffected. Similarly, both the probability of audit for an individual 
who reports low income and the aggregate probability of audit are unchanged . 
In addition to having no effect on either auditing or the aggregate level of 
noncompliance, changes in the percentage of strategic taxpayers also have no 
effect on expected revenue. 39 This observation yields a provocative con­
clusion: an exogenous increase in the proportion of strategic taxpayers has no 
impact on aggregate expected revenues or aggregate compliance and should 
consequently have no effect on aggregate auditing policy. Not only is no 
change in audit policy warranted to correct for the increase in strategic 
behavior, but also, as long as a sufficiently large fraction of taxpayers behaves 
38. See above, section 2.
39. Expected revenue net of audit costs is
R = (1 - q)[�(TL - c) + O - �)TL] + q[( l  - p)TH +_ p(l - a)TH]
+ qpa[j3(TH + F - c) + (1 - 13)TL] .
Using the definitions of PN and PA, this can be rewritten as 
R = [(l - q) + PN]TL - P,tC - PN[TH - �(TH + F - TL)] .
Since PN, PA, and � are all independent of p, so is expected revenue net of audit costs.
t 
f 
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strategically. to increases in the proportion of strategic taxpayers do not 
account for declining compliance and tax revenues . -t i
.5 . EXTENSION S  A N D  MODIFICATIONS O F  THE BASIC MODEL
The discussion of our model's predictions in  part 4 shows clearly that
models of tax compliance that include the IRS as a strategic actor can yield 
results both distinct from and richer than models that include only the 
taxpayer. The model we have delineated to make this point is, by design, very 
simple. It nevertheless yields a number of interesting results; therefore, it 
becomes useful to ask how robust are these results to various extensions or 
modifications of the basic model. In this part, we summarize the effects of 
introducing into the model proportional taxation and fines, taxpayer audit 
costs, IRS budget constraints, more than two taxpayer income levels, and 
alternative IRS objective functions. 
5. 1 .  PHOPORTION:\L TAX.HION AND FI'.\IES
In our basic model we allow tax levels and fines to take relatively arbitrary 
values (in particular, we require only that TL � TH) . A special case often 
considered in the literature assumes that taxes are proportional to income. Let 
the tax rate he denoted hy t, \vhere 0 < t < 1. \Ve then have TH = tIH and
TL = tIL . Further, since penalties for underreporting are generally propor­
tional to evaded tax, we can assume F = 1Tt(/H - hl where 1T is the penalty
rate on evaded ta.x, 1T � 0. If these expressions for tax levels and the fine are
substituted into the equilibrium values for the probability of noncompliance 
and probability of audit of part 3, we get, respectively, 
a = ( 1 - qk!pq[t([H - h) + 1Tt(!H - h) - c] (6) 
-10. In order to guarantee that the prohahility of noncompliance for a strategic taxpayer with
high incomt• is less than one \CT < ! ) we require (1 - q)clpq[TH + F - TL - c] < 1 or p > 
0 - q)c/q[Tu + F - TL - c] .  If p falls hdow this level the equilibrium involves no auditing
and no compli<llK'l' ll\· strategic taxpayers. In this case increases in the proportion of strategic 
taxpavers affect nothing except expected reH:·nue. which falls .
-ti. \\'hilt· this conclusion is indeed provocative. we are not suggesting that it  he used as the 
basis for policv decisions. The model we present in this paper is. as we have emphasized. 
designed to illustrate the kind of results one can get from an interactive model. \\'e view it as an 
important first step. hut no more than that. and caution should therefore be used in applying the 
results. The result that an increase in the proportion of strategic noncompliers has no effect on 
aggregate noncompliance or aggregate re\·enues may, for example. not be true where such an 
increase has the effect of changing a nonbinding budget constraint into a binding one, even if the 
results described in the text would hold in eases where either there was no binding budget 
l�>nstraint or where the budget constraint was already binding. :\ model with a binding budget
constraint is discussed below in section 5.3. 
L 
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and 
� = [u(/n _ th) - u(/If._l - t))]l[u(/H - th) - u(/If._ 1  - t) - -rrt(/H - h))]. (7)
Table 2 summarizes how changes in the tax rate, the penalty rate, and the
difference between �igh and low income affect individual noncompliance and
audit levels (Ci and J3 respectively) and aggregate noncompliance and audit
levels (PN and PA respectively). 
An increase in the penalty rate decreases equilibrium noncompliance and 
equilibrium auditing, both at the individual and the aggregate level.  This is 
consistent with the general results summarized in table 1 and follows from the 
same logic given in the discussion of fines following that table. Similarly, the 
model shows that increases in the tax rate, like increases in the degree of 
progressivity, decrease individual and aggregate noncompliance. The popular 
press and many government and academic commentators often assume the 
opposite, and particular equilibrium models are generally ambiguous on this 
matter; in the standard models ,  whether an increase in the tax rate increases 
or decreases noncompliance depends largely on the risk preferences of 
taxpayers. 42 
Table 2. Direction of Change: Proportional Tax and Fines 
Exogenous parameter to be increased 
Endogenous variable 
Individual probability 
of noncompliance (ii) 
Aggregate probability 
of noncompliance (PN) 
Individual probability 
of audit (�) 
Aggregate probability 






* *  
*Ambiguous i n  general; when taxpayers are risk-neutral, these entries are 0. 






* *  
42. Allingham and Sandmo found that when the fine is proportional to unreported income 
(F = "Tl"(IH - h)), an increase in the tax rate has both an income and a substitution effect. Since 
the substitution effect is negative while the income effect is positive (negative), if absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing (increasing), the net effect of an increase in the tax rate is ambiguous in the 
(presumed most likely) case of decreasing absolute risk aversion. Yitzhaki has noted, however, 
that penalties for evasion are most often proportional to evaded tax, not unreported income, so 
that the income effect is spurious. Instead he finds that if absolute risk aversion is a decreasing
function of income, then an increase in the tax rate unambiguously enhances compliance. If 
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In our model, equilibrium compliance is enhanced by an increase in the tax 
rate, regardless of the risk preferences of taxpayers . The intuition behind this 
result is the same as that which explains why increases in the degree of 
progressivity increase equilibrium compliance-both the incentive to under­
report and the incentive to audit increase, and the latter dominates in equilib­
rium.  A similar analysis explains why equilibrium compliance increases with 
income inequality, as measured by the difference between the high and low 
income levels. In general, the dependence of audit probabilities, both at the 
level of an individual low-income report (�) and at the aggregate level (PA) ,
upon the tax rate and the extent of income inequality are ambiguous. 43 
5.2. TAXPAYER ALTDIT COSTS 
We have heretofore assumed that audits are costless to taxpayers, but an 
audit can be both costly and time-consuming even if the taxpayer has reported 
honestly and can demonstrate the accuracy of his or her report. Suppose 
that all taxpayers suffer a cost of k when audited. The net expected revenue
generated by an audit is unaffected since taxpayer audit costs can be regarded 
as a deadweight loss rather than a transfer to the government. 44 Thus it is
clear that it still never pays the IRS to audit individuals who report high 
income. However, if, for example, taxpayer audit costs are large or the 
difference in taxes is small , low-income taxpayers might prefer to report high 
income, in order to avoid taxpayer audit costs . 
Analysis of this amended model yields the following results (assuming the 
marginal utility of income does not fall too rapidly-for details, see Graetz et 
al. , 1983) : In equilibrium, all low-income taxpayers still report low income,
and high-income strategic taxpayers use the same strategy as when taxpayer 
audit costs are zero. 45 The IRS' s equilibrium audit probability for individual
low-income reports becomes less than the equilibrium audit probability for 
individual low-income reports when taxpayer audit costs are zero. 46 
Thus, taxpayer audit costs have no effect on equilibrium noncompliance; no 
low-income taxpayer elects to overreport and the same fraction of high-
43. In the ease of risk-neutral taxpayers, � = 11(1 + ir), which is independent of both tax
rates and the income differential, while PA decreases with an increase in either of these
parameters. 
44. Taxpayer audit t�>sts may include fees paid to attorneys. accountants, tax-return prepar­
ers. or other third-party agents involved in the revenue collection process. These agents are 
outside our model, so the fact that these costs are a transfer rather than a pure deadweight loss is 
irrelevant. Revenue will generally not be increased by such transfers because amounts that will 
be included in the recipients' taxable incomes are typically deductible to the payor (under Internal Revenue Code Section 212(3)). \Ve ignore any revenue effects that might result becausethe payor does not itemize deductions or because payors and recipients are in different marginaltax brackets.
45. That is. ii =  c(l - q)!(TH - TL + F - ell. 
� _46. The IRS"s equilibrium audit probability for low-income reports becomes:
- [u(]H - TL) - u(IH - TH)]/[u(/H - TL) - u(/8 - T8 - F - k)]. 
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income strategic taxpayers elects to underreport. The easiest way to see why 
no low-income taxpayers overreport is to recognize that all taxpayers must pay 
the taxpayer audit cost if they are actually audited. Assume, then. that 
low-income strategic taxpayers report high income in order to avoid the risk of 
incurring these costs, paying unnecessary taxes (TH - TL) to do so. Gener­
ally this implies that a high-income strategic taxpayer will not risk paying the 
taxpayer audit costs plus the fine for underreporting to save an identical 
amount in taxes; he or she would also prefer to report high inconw. But then it 
would never pay to audit, and in such circumstances all strategic taxpayers 
would report low income. So it must be the case that in equilibrium all 
low-income strategic taxpayers report honestly. Hence the existence of posi­
tive taxpayer audit costs affects only the equilibrium audit probability. which 
is reduced; the same level of noncompliance is sustained with a lower lt.•\·c l of 
auditing. 
Taxpayer audit costs may depend to some extent upon the complexity of 
the tax law. If an increase in taxpayer audit costs is due to increased complex­
ity, however, it is also likely to be accompanied by an increase in the IRS's 
audit costs. Thus an increase in the complexity of the law can result in both 
more noncompliance (because of the increase in the IRS's audit costs) and a 
lower probability of audit for each taxpayer who reports low income (because 
of the increase in taxpayer audit costs). However, since the number of 
low-income reports is increased, the net effect on the aggregate number of 
audits is ambiguous. 
5.3. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
All formal models make simplifying assumptions and our basic model is no 
different from others in this regard. It is, however, important to understand to 
what extent any model, especially one that may have implications for public 
policy decisions,  is sensitive to these kind of assumptions. Two of the most 
crucial simplifying assumptions in our basic model are that income only takes 
one of two values and that the IRS faces no budget constraint. We have 
examined the effects of relaxing both of these assumptions and the results of 
those analyses appear to be closely related. The effects of a binding budget 
constraint seem now, as a formal matter, to depend on whether income can 
take more than two values. In this section we discuss the effects of imposing a 
budget constraint on the model, while maintaining the hypothesis of only two 
income levels (and, implicitly , only two possible levels of reported income). In 
the next section we discuss the effects of introducing a range of possible 
income levels, both without and with a budget constraint. 
In the _equilibrium of our basic model, the IRS would like to audit, on 
average, 13 percent of all low-income reports .  But a budget constraint may
limit the IRS to auditing some fraction of all taxpayers, say >..  If>.. < �, the IRS
sometimes might wish to audit more taxpayers than it can afford. In other 
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words, for the budget constraint not to bind, the budget must be large �nough
that the IRS can afford to audit every taxpayer with probability 13 (it is
potentially the case that all taxpayers report low income, so to eliminate any 
effects due to a budget constraint, the IRS must be able in principle to audit 
them all with the desired probability �). An analysis of optimal auditing and
reporting strategies in this case quickly becomes complicated. We have 
performed this task elsewhere (Graetz et al . ,  1984) and will only summarize 
the results in this paper. 
Consider first the taxpayer side of the problem. A binding budget con­
straint may dramatically affect taxpayer behavior. If the IRS faces a binding 
budget constraint, the probability that any individual taxpayer will be audited 
depends on the behavior of other taxpayers; the odds that any individual 
taxpayer will be audited are much lower if everyone with high income reports 
low income than if everyone reports honestly. Thus, if one looks only at the 
taxpayer side of the problem, IRS budget constraints produce "congestion" 
that leads to the existence of multiple equilibrium reporting strategies when­
ever the budget is neither too high nor too low. In one of these equilibria no 
strategic taxpayer ever complies and in the other they always comply. This 
congestion feature of the compliance problem largely has been ignored in the 
crime and punishment literature generally and appears nowhere in the litera­
ture on tax compliance. -t7 Some authors do consider the effects of budget 
constraints (Greenberg), but none explicitly model the strategic interaction 
between taxpayers , so that this congestion effect never arises. Some surveys 
report that noncompliance is more likely as a taxpayer knows more taxpayers 
who have failed to comply (Spicer and Lundstedt; Song and Yarbrough) but 
usually offer psychological or sociological, not economic, explanations for this 
phenomenon. 
Of course the taxpayer's response to audit rules is only part of the story. 
Since universal compliance eliminates auditing it can never be part of a "full 
equilibrium. " In fact, in the simple framework of our model, the addition of 
the IRS as a strategic actor generally produces a unique equilibrium, and a 
binding constraint on the IRS budget typically leads to total noncompliance 
(by strategic taxpayers with high income) . When the budget constraint does 
not bind, of course, the equilibrium is as described in part 3 of this paper. 
That the introduction of a binding budget constraint into our basic model 
generally implies total noncompliance by strategic taxpayers is a disturbing 
result. The reason for this result is, however, clear; as we discussed above, 
whether a strategic taxpayer with high income complies depends on whether 
the audit probability is greater than or equal to a trigger value (�). If the
presence of a budget constraint means the IRS cannot attain this level of 
auditing, then no strategic taxpayer will ever report high income. In such an
47. For an exception see Nagin, who points out that the observed negative relationshipbetween index crime rates and sanction levels may be explained by a constraint on total prison
P<>pulations. 
l 
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equilibrium, changes in other parameters cannot affect behavior unless they 
result in lowering the trigger value sufficiently to make the budget constraint 
non binding. 
Several points need to be made regarding this result. The first, and most 
important, is that it now appears largely to be an artifact of the assumption that 
income is restricted to one of two levels. This assumption reduces the compli­
ance problem simply to a comply/do not comply choice that is extremely 
sensitive to the probability of audit. In Reinganum and \\'il<le ( 1985) we
examined a related model that assumes income is randomly distributed on 
some range of values. The analysis of that model is extremely technical \and 
certain other simplifying assumptions have to be introduced) but, although 
this is surely not the last word, the qualitative results there are relatively 
insensitive to the presence of a binding budget constraint and in other 
respects are similar to the results discussed in this paper. 41> 
A second, and related, point concerns the assumption implicit in a budget­
constrained model that the budget constraint applies separately to IRS audit 
activity. The IRS, in fact, has the capability of shifting resources among a 
variety of administrative and enforcement activities. \Vhen such shifts are 
possible, there may be no binding budget constraint in terms of qualitative 
effects. 49 In other words, the qualitative effects summarized in table 1 will
continue to hold. When, as we suggested earlier, the results of the basic 
model are regarded as applying within a relatively small range of income-for 
example, within a single audit class or category of taxpayer, such as large 
corporations-an identical point may be made about the lack of a binding 
budget constraint in analyzing that aspect of the noncompliance problem. 
Finally, even if there were a separate budget constraint on audit activity, 
our simple model will still be useful in evaluating how various changes in the 
underlying parameters affect whether the budget constraint is, in fact, bind­
ing. Until we know how much the IRS might want to audit, we cannot tell 
whether its budget prevents it from auditing that much. This is not merely a 
matter of the size of the budget; the constraint binds whenever the IHS is 
unable to audit all of the taxpayers it might want to audit. For example, if 
taxpayers are indifferent to risk, our model implies the IRS should want to 
audit the fraction � = (TH - TL)!(TH - TL + F) of those taxpayers who
report low income. Thus, in this case, the budget constraint binds wheneverA <  (TH - TL)!(TH - TL + F),  where A is again the percentage of the
total number of taxpayers that the IRS can afford to audit. Thus the budget 
constraint is more likely to bind when the budget is small, the cost per audit is 
high, the fine is low, or the difference between the taxes owed by a high­
income and a low-income taxpayer is large. 
48. The next section will discuss these results in more detail.
49. See Wertz for a model that illustrates this point.
-- - ------
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5. 4. .MORE THAN Two INCOME LEVELS 
Perhaps the strongest assumption of our basic model is that taxpayers' true 
income must take one of only two values. This greatly simplifies the analysis 
by reducing the compliance problem to a simple comply/do not comply 
decision. In Reinganum and \Vilde ( 1984) we analyze an interactive model of 
tax compliance in which income can take any value in some range. In such a 
case, taxpayers must decide both whether and how much to underreport based 
on their true income and the IRS's audit policy. The latter consists of a 
probability of audit for each reported level of income. The primary analysis in 
that paper seeks to characterize the form of taxpayers ' equilibrium reporting 
rules and the IRS' s equilibrium audit rule. That analysis is mathematically 
very complex and extremely technical, but under some plausible assump­
tions, it shows that, in one equil ibrium at least, within a given audit class, the 
audit rule is decreasing in the level of reported income and the reporting rule 
is such that all taxpayers underreport, but by an amount which is decreasing in 
true income.  
As  suggested previously, the effects of  introducing a binding budget con­
straint on this model are quite different than in the simpler two-income 
model. If a binding budget constraint is introduced, the audit rate falls for 
each level of reported income and the extent of underreporting increases, but 
the basic qualitative properties of the model remain intact. The reason for this 
is that with a range of possible true incomes , taxpayers can choose a level of 
noncompliance, not just whether to comply. If the IRS is constrained to audit 
less often that it would like, compliance levels will fall ,  but not so drastically as 
in the two-income model. 
5.5. OTH ER IRS OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
As we discussed in part 2 of this article, introducing the law enforcement 
agency into models of tax compliance requires us to specify in formal terms 
both the actions available to the IRS and the nature of its preferences with 
respect to those actions . In our basic model, the actions available to the IRS 
are probabilities of audit, and we characterize their preferences with respect 
to different probabilities of audit in terms of expected total revenue (the 
aggregate of taxes collected plus penalties and fines) net of the costs of audit. 
This seems a natural starting point, but alternative candidates for IRS objec­
tive functions certainly exist. 
To illustrate the impact of choosing a different IRS objective function, 
suppose, for example, that the IRS is interested in maximizing only the 
amount of understated income discovered by the audit process (again net of
audit costs ); that is, it does not take into account fines or ta"<es or any income 
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reported by those taxpayers who are not audited. 50 The expected benefit 
from auditing a low-income report is now the sum of the probability of 
detecting noncompliance times the difference between high and low income, 
minus the cost of the audit. 51 
When this new objective function is used, the equilibrium level of auditing 
is unchanged, but both individual and aggregate noncompliance under the 
new objective function increase or decrease as the difference between high 
and low income (IH - h) is less than or greater than the sum of the additional 
tax collected plus the fine (TH + F - TL) . 52 In fact, there exists a critical 
level of the fine such that with the new objective function there will be less 
noncompliance for any fine less than the critical value and more noncompli­
ance for any fine greater than the critical value.53 However, the qualitative 
properties of the new equilibrium will be the same as in our basic model, 
except that noncompliance now depends on the difference in income between 
the high-income and low-income taxpayers rather than the difference in tax 
levels and is independent of the fine. 54 
As this brief discussion of one alternative IRS objective function suggests, 
specifying the IRS's decisionmaking rule may have a substantial effect on the 
predictions of an interactive model such as ours . By generally ignoring the law 
.'50. I n  formal terms we can express these preferences as 
TI(a, 13)  = 13(µ(/H - h) + ( l  - µ.)0 - C) = 13(µ(/H - h) - c). 
where the variables are the same as in part 3. In particular, 13 is the probability of audit given a 
report oflow income, and µ is tht' probahilitv that a taxpayer who reports low incornt' is actuall�· a 
strategic taxpayer with high income who has underreported . 
. '51. Audits generated by TC:\f P are apparently based on the amount ofaclclitional tax revenue 
that is likelv to he generated bv an audit ,  not on fines or the tax ren•nut· receiw•d from those 
taxpayers �ho are not audited. C)ur alterncJtive objective fonction is based onh- on the amount of
income that is likely to he discovered and thus emphasizes accuracy on·r rt'\Tlll ll' ( see \\'crtz). If 
the IRS acted so as to maximize the totc1l expected income known to the gon·rnment nt'! of audit 
eosts, i t  would use the objective function 
TI(a, 13) = 13(µ/H + ( 1 - µ)h - c) + ( 1 - 13 )h.
This would yield precisely the same audit noncompliance rates <IS t h e  alternative objective 
function discussed in the text and specified in the preceding note. 
52. The probability of noncompliance by strategic taxpayers with high income is now
a = 0 - q)clpq(/H - h - c). 
The textual assertion may be tested bv comparing this expression for the equilibrium probability 
of audit given a report of low income to the analogous expression in our basic model. 
53. The eritical value of the fine is  defined by F* = IH - h - TH + TL . Hecall that we
assume F � IH - TH; that is,  the IRS cannot take more income from noncompliers than they
have. But F* � IH - TH if and only if TL � h. which we also assume. I n  other words.  there 
alwavs exist feasible levels of the fine hoth ahuve and below the critical value. 
S4 . If the IRS i gnores tax rate:; aud iines in determining its audit policy, those factors, at least
in our simple model, will have no effect on the probability of compliance. This is because 
taxpayers behave in a way that responds tu IRS audit incentives, in equilibrium generating 
neither too much or too little auditing. Tax rates and fines, however, mav still affect the 
equilibrium level of auditing because auditing responds indirectly to strategic taxpayers' incen­
tives to underrepurt, and these incentives will still he affected hy tax rates and fines. 
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enforcement agency as an actor in the compliance process, this controversial 
task is avoided in the standard economics-of-crime literature. 
\Ve believe that the revenue-maximizing objective function used in our 
basic model adequately captures both the general and the specific deterrence 
objectives often attributed to IRS enforcement policy. Many anecdotal de­
scriptions of IRS behavior-such as agents identifying and counting the 
corporate jets at the Superbowl or Kentucky Derby or publicizing tax fraud 
indictments just before the April 15 tax return filing deadline-may fit gener­
ally with such a revenue maximization objective function .  It may well be the 
case that the IRS would place greater weight on maximizing tax collections 
than on fines. but we have not yet been able to agree on a weighing that we 
consider clearly superior to total revenue maximization. In any event, refining 
and defending descriptions of the objectives and behavior of the relevant law 
enforcement agency should be an important continuing aspect of tax compli­
ance research, as well as of applications of interactive models such as ours to 
other law enforcement contexts. 
6. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to illustrate that the introduction of the law
enforcement agency into a game-theoretic analysis of tax compliance offers 
considerable opportunity for insights and predictions that are simply not 
possible in the standard economic analysis of law enforcement. Relationships 
that have previously been ignored in the economic literature become clarified 
by a formal model that explicitly integrates taxpayers and the IRS.  Consider­
ing the effects on both sides of many important elements of the tax compliance 
problem-for example, of legal complexity, potentially declining ethics, and 
changes in the tax rate or its progressivity--often implies very different 
conclusions than would emerge from looking only at the taxpayer side of the 
compliance problem . In addition, the way in which the law enforcement 
agency takes the relevant legal structure into account-for example, how fines 
and penalties enter into its objective function--demonstrates explicitly the 
role of agency behavior and preferences in addressing the compliance prob­
lem. �loreover. the game-theoretic approach described here makes it possi­
ble to consider the existence of and interactions among a variety of types of 
taxpayers. who may have differing attitudes or opportunities for noncompli­
ance. In the tax compliance context at least, where the law enforcement 
agency is known to alter its behavior in light of taxpayers' reports, we believe 
our theoretical construct to be a major improvement. 
The theoretical approach offered here also presents numerous opportuni­
ties for further refinement and extensions. For example, variations in the flow 
of information between taxpayers and the law enforcement agency may have a 
significant impact on the results of our models. In addition, it should be 
possible to introduce important third parties into the analysis; in the tax 
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compliance context, for example, the role of attorneys, accountants, and 
tax-return preparers merits exploration .  55 
Other legal contexts offer opportunities for further exploration of theoreti­
cal models along the lines we have described. Many regulatory contexts 
require initial reporting by the entity that is being monitored; some important 
examples include securities regulation, employment discrimination regula­
tion, food and drug regulation, and environmental regulation. In addition, the 
administration of many government expenditures, including public welfare 
and transfer programs, begin with the submission of a claim for relief. Thus, 
our approach might provide insights into the administration of programs such 
as those involving public welfare, unemployment compensation, and disabil­
ity insurance. 
Finally, it seems necessary to subject our approach to empirical testing. 56 
To date, the rather sparse empirical work on tax compliance considers the 
important variables on the law enforcement side, such as the probability of 
audit, to be exogenous, rather than endogenously determined based upon the 
level of noncompliance. To the extent that these empirical studies take into 
account IRS responses such as establishing a "Discriminant Index Function" 
for selecting returns for audit or determining the volume of notices sent to 
taxpayers, our theoretical work suggests that interrelationships (technically, a 
simultaneity problem) might affect empirical results. 57 
Moreover, the inclusion of the law enforcement agency as an interactive 
participant in a formal model of compliance suggests numerous possibilities 
for analyzing important legal institutions. In addition to government agencies ,  
such as  the IRS and the other regulatory and administrative bodies listed 
above, a variety of actors have significant functions, coupled with considerable 
discretion, in implementing the mandates of law; prosecutors and juries are 
but two important examples. Interactive law enforcement models, such as 
that offered here, should have considerable advantages in exploring the 
impact on predicted behavior of the differing goals and information of the 
members of such institutions. 
55. For further discussion. see Graetz and Wilde.
56. For a discussion of the existing empirical literature on tax compliance see Graetz and
Wilde. 
57. Levels of noncompliance depend on a number of factors, including, for example, the
likelihood of audit. At the same time, the likelihood of audit depends on the level of noncompli­
ance. Thus it is inappropriate to use the likelihood of audit as an exogenous variable to estimate an 
equation meant to explain the causes of noncompliance. Technically, the results in such a case are 
said to be subject to "simultaneity bias . ·· As an empirical matter this problem can be overcome by 
including an additional equation that explains the probability of audit as a function of levels of 
noncompliance and other factors such as IRS resources. This, however. has not yet been done. An 
example of the potential problem with simultaneity bias is provided by Witte and Woodbury 
(1985). These authors, working with 1969 TCMP  data, include audit rates and sanction levels as 
explanatory variables in an empirical analysis of compliance, but fail to deal with the simultaneity 
problem. They, in fact, find that for some taxpayer classes the probability of a civil fraud penalty is 
negatively related to voluntary compliance. This may be explained by simultaneity bias but may 
also be explained by the failure of audit rates to proxy accurately the likelihood of detection. 
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